Private Language Argument and Rule-Following According to Wittgenstein and his Interpreters
Abstract
I intend to join in my paper
the debate around Wittgenstein’s private language argument and its relation to
the problem of rule-following. In this paper, I will discuss the difficulties
and puzzles that have arisen from the organization and the style of the Philosophical
Investigations. I have turned to the ‘skeptical’ interpretation proposed by
Saul Kripke (1982), reactions to this interpretation by many philosophers, and
I will defend the Kripke’s interpretation, not as a correct or an exact
interpretation, but as a relevant one to the current debate in Philosophy of
Mind and Cognitive Science about the nature of mind and how it works.
I will make some remarks on
private language as it was conceived by some Arab traditional thinkers (Al
Qarafi Shihab Edin, particularly in his analysis of the way different persons
talk about the same qualia or the same phenomenal experiences). I will
also indicate the great importance of the recent translation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations, from German to Arabic, for the philosophical and linguistic
debate in the contemporary Arab World.
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